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I
INTRODUCTION

It was a scene emblematic of the Wall Street scandals of the 1980s. Three
employees of a leading investment bank were arrested in a carefully
orchestrated, pre-dawn "raid" and charged with insider trading. Extensive
publicity followed, as commentators opined that the stock markets were rife
with trading abuses and in desperate need of reform. After a three-week trial,
however, a jury acquitted one of the defendants and the charges against the
remaining defendants were eventually dropped.
Before the episode is characterized as an example of excessive
prosecutorial zeal by law enforcement authorities in the United States, it
should be noted that the foregoing events took place in Melbourne, Australia,
not New York City.' Indeed, as the 1980s drew to a close, they could have
occurred in any of a number of the world's leading financial centers.
Although episodic, the recent events in Melbourne illustrate the changing
global attitudes toward insider trading.2 Not so long ago, insider trading,
even if not viewed as a problem confined to U.S. markets, was often
considered a concern peculiar to the United States. That is no longer the
case. Virtually every country with a major stock market has adopted, or is
actively considering, provisions outlawing insider trading. Of particular
import, the Council of the European Community has issued a directive that
obligates the Member States of the European Economic Community ("EEC")
to adopt legislation byJune 1, 1992, to ban insider trading. 3 Countries with
developing stock markets likewise have taken, or are in the process of taking,
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steps to prohibit insider trading as a means of promoting confidence in the
4
integrity of the markets.
The example from Australia reveals another aspect of the international
regulation of insider trading: the mere adoption of statutes banning insider
dealing does not ensure that authorities will successfully prove violations of
the law. Moreover, if the current attitude in the United States is that those
found guilty of insider trading should be left "naked, homeless, and without
wheels,' 5 many countries appear to view the practice as meriting no more
than a stiff warning, akin to a traffic ticket. Nevertheless, there are many
indications that foreign jurisdictions are beginning to place a higher priority
on enforcement.
This article examines, from the perspective of two practitioners, current
trends in the global regulation of insider trading. Part II highlights the
principal factors that account for the recent enactment or enhancement of
insider trading legislation abroad. Part III reviews, in greater detail, the laws
of the following countries: Australia, France, Germany, Japan, and Mexico.
The common features of these laws are identified, as are the principal areas in
which the laws of the various jurisdictions diverge. Part IV identifies lessons
that the United States can learn from international insider trading legislation.
Finally, Part V suggests that, in light of international trends, multinational
corporations and service firms should evaluate the need for firm-wide policies
relating to securities trading by employees.
II
THE SUDDEN RUSH TO REGULATE

The regulation and prosecution of insider trading in the United States has

been, by far, the most vigorous of any country in the world. Even in the
United States, however, views regarding the need to prohibit insider trading
vary widely. While some economists argue that insider trading promotes an
efficient market in securities, 6 others contend that sound economic reasons
7
justify the aggressive prosecution of insider trading.
The federal courts and members of Congress have repeatedly justified
restrictions on insider trading on the grounds that the practice offends basic
4. See, for example, Asia's Emerging Equities Markets, East Asian Exec Rep 22 (Jan 15, 1991)
(discussing insider trading laws in Taiwan, South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand).
5. See Kevin G. Salwen & Laurie P. Cohen, Getting Tough: SEC Under Breeden Takes a Harder Line
on Securities Crime, Wall StJ Al col 6 (May 10, 1990).
6. See, for example, Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Stock Market 93-110 (Free Press,
1966); Hsiu-Kwang Wu, An Economist Looks at Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 68 Colum
L Rev 260 (1968).
7. See, for example, RonaldJ. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 Va L Rev 549, 629 (1984) (concluding that the economic argument in favor of eliminating
restrictions on insider trading is "weak"); Joseph A. Grundfest, Remarks to National Investor Relations
Institute in New York City (June 20, 1986), reprinted in 18 Sec Reg & L Rep (BNA) No 26, at 936 (June
27, 1986) (asserting that "[t]here is an optimal point at which information should be disclosed and it
can be inefficient if information is disclosed either too soon or too late").
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notions of fairness 8 and jeopardizes public confidence in the integrity of U.S.
markets .9
In comparison with the United States, where the law of insider trading has
developed over the past thirty years, ' 0 insider trading in the capital markets of
many other nations has been subject historically either to regulations rarely
enforced or to no regulation at all.II For example, as recently as 1986, only
three of the twelve Member States of the EEC (Denmark, France, and the
United Kingdom) prohibited insider trading.' 2 While some nations have no
history of regulating insider trading, other countries consider insider trading,
as defined in the United States, to be a respectable activity traditionally
engaged in by directors and officers. 13
Given the longstanding indifference to insider dealing in many nations, the
rush to prohibit insider trading, or to enforce dormant laws against the
practice, is all the more striking. Three principal factors appear to motivate
most countries to crack down on insider trading: competitive pressures,
international enforcement efforts, and technological developments.
A.

Competitive Pressures

The internationalization of the world's capital markets is, by now, taken for
granted, as technological advances have contributed to astonishing growth in
8. See, for example, Chiarella v United States, 445 US 222, 245 (1980) (Burger, CJ, dissenting)
("Chiarella .. .misappropriated-stole to put itbluntly-valuable nonpublic information entrusted
to him in the utmost confidence .. .[and] then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by
purchasing securities in the market.").
9. See, for example, Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, Hearings before the Subcommittee
on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong, 2d Sess
1 (1984) (remarks of Sen. D'Amato) ("the integrity of the market is the victim [of insider trading]
since it is seriously undermined").
10. The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission") adopted Rule lOb-5,
its principal weapon against insider trading, in 1943, after members of the SEC's staff were advised
that a corporate insider was purchasing shares of a company's stock without disclosing a material fact
that would cause the market price to rise. See Milton V. Freeman, Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus
Law 891, 922 (April 1967). While a federal court implied a private remedy under Rule lob-5 for
insider trading in Speed v Transamerica Corp., 71 F Supp 457, 458 (D Del 1947), the law of insider
trading in the United States truly began to develop with the seminal decision of the SEC in In re Cady,
Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907 (1961).
11. Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 Stan L Rev 857,
860 (1983).
12. Note, Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Transnational Securities Fraud: A Suggested Roadmap to the
New Standardof Reasonableness, 71 Cornell L Rev 919, 936 (1986) (authored by David Michaels).
13. See, for example, Larry Zaglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the
Japanese Equity Market Into the Global Securities Market, 1987 Colum Bus L Rev 419, 421 (noting that
"[t]he cultivation of close ties to sources of information in order to obtain advance notice of
significant corporate developments has long been considered an important service offered by
Japanese brokerage firms"); Andr6 Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporation Law and
Securities Regulation, 130 U Pa L Rev 757, 762 (1982) (tipping of inside information considered "a
social duty . . . expected of relatives and friends" in France); Craig Forman, Old World Traditions
Include Insider Trading," Wall StJ CI col 3 (Feb 8, 1989) (quoting an EEC official as stating that, in
some European countries, "it is considered a very normal consequence, and not a bad thing, to profit
from information [you] happen to have").
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cross-border transactions.' 4 As markets have become more international in
character, they have also grown more competitive. Since rampant insider
trading in a nation's markets often impairs the attractiveness of that market to
foreign participants, competitive pressures may lead to adoption of laws
prohibiting insider dealing or to stricter enforcement of existing laws.
At heart, these pressures are not radically different in character from the
domestic pressures that have led countries to ban insider trading.' 5 In
international parlance, insider trading is often condemned as inconsistent
with the need for "transparent" markets, markets with procedures and trade
standards that are fair and comprehensible to foreign investors. 16
Moreover, countries that do not appear to be taking steps to prohibit
insider trading frequently receive harsh criticism, often from countries with
competing securities markets. Within the EEC, there is a widely-held
perception that a handful of financial centers will dominate the European
markets in the years ahead.' 7 It is, therefore, not surprising that the British
press has seized upon recent reports on insider trading in Germany as
evidence of that country's loosely supervised markets,' 8 or that, in response,
German bankers have voiced support for additional insider trading legislation
and stronger enforcement.' 9
14. For example, the volume of U.S. equity securities purchased and sold from abroad increased
several-fold, from $25.6 billion in 1977 to $481.9 billion in 1987. See Problems with the SEC's
Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws in Cases Involving Suspicious Trades Originating from Abroad,
HR Rep No 100-1065, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 3 (1988) ("Suspicious Trades").
15. Pressures to curb insider trading often surface when a broader cross section of society elects
to participate in a country's stock market. See, for example, Joseph Blum, The Regulation of Insider
Trading in Germany: Who's Afraid of Self-Restraint?, 7 NwJ Intl L & Bus 507, 513 (1986) (pressures for
restrictions on insider trading in Germany arose after World War II, when German citizens were
encouraged to invest in stock markets); Party's Over in India As Boom Goes Bust, Assoc Press (Sept 28,
1987) (emergence of middle-class investors in India led to demands for insider trading regulations
and other market reforms).
16. See, for example, Japan Approves Stricter Rules to Combat Insider Trading, Washington Post F5
col 2 (Feb 1, 1989) (quotingJapan's Finance Minister as stating that "regulations on insider trading
are indispensable for sound development of our country's securities market by increasing the sense
of fairness and transparency in the stock market"); Europeans Are Steering for Market Reform, LA Times
D9 col 1 (Aug 17, 1988) (quoting French Finance Minister Pierre Beregovoy as emphasizing the need
for "more transparency for the markets ... to protect the safety of small investors"). See also Policy
Statement of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation of International
Securities Markets 11 (Nov 1988) (asserting that "[i]nvestors will seek out markets they perceive as
fair and honest" and that "[c]ountries that do not have prohibitions against insider trading . . . risk
becoming havens for illegal activities").
17. See, for example, Ferdinand Protzman, Insider Trading Scandal Grows, NY Times D6 col 3
(July 23, 1991) (discussing efforts in Germany to promote Frankfurt as site for the proposed
European central bank); Stephen Greenhouse, An Old Club Transformed, NY Times D6 col 4 (July 23,
1991) (noting that recent steps to upgrade securities enforcement in France have distinguished Paris
Bourse from "rival European markets in Milan or Madrid").
18. See, for example, Katherine Campbell, Spotlight Falls on German Trading Practices, Fin Times
124 (July 3, 1991) (concluding that German trading practices "fall well short of those appropriate to
an aspiring international centre," and quoting a former Deutsche Bank employee as stating that "[a]s
far as trading ethics go, this is still virtually a third world country").
19. See, for example, Insider Trading in Germany, Wall StJ A6 col 1 (July 24, 1991) (noting that
opposition to central supervisory authority "has crumbled among Germany's powerful banks");
Ferdinand Protzman, Insider Trading Scandal Grows, NY Times D6 col 3 (July 23, 1991) (quoting
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Efforts underway within the EEC, and elsewhere, to reduce barriers to
takeovers may also spur efforts to regulate insider trading, as more active
markets for corporate control are often associated with higher levels of insider
trading. In the United States, for example, the frenzied market for takeovers
during the 1980s, combined with the growth in the trading of options and
other financial instruments, was often cited as having created new
opportunities for unscrupulous traders to profit from inside information. 20
Hostile takeovers remain largely an unknown phenomenon in many
foreign countries, where a panoply of legal, structural, and cultural barriers to
unsolicited changes in corporate control exist. 2 ' Companies in the United
Kingdom and the United States, where comparatively few structural
restrictions exist on takeovers, have long objected to the competitive
disadvantages they face when pursuing foreign acquisitions. In response to
such concerns, the EEC has proposed a directive on takeovers that would
establish bidding procedures and place limits on the defensive measures
which target companies may employ. 2 2 Despite these developments,
substantial barriers to an active market for corporate control are likely to
persist in many countries for the foreseeable future. To the extent that the
number of foreign mergers and acquisitions increases 23 and barriers to
takeovers erode, however, the opportunities for insider trading and the
pressures for effective insider trading laws can be expected to mount.
B.

International Enforcement

The internationalization of the securities markets not only facilitates global
investing, but also creates new opportunities for insider trading. For
example, unscrupulous traders may seek to trade through accounts in
jurisdictions with secrecy and blocking laws that purport to preclude the
Rudiger von Rosen, Managing Director of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange, as stating that "[elveryone
here wants laws making insider trading a criminal offense").
20. SEC and Insider Trading, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong, 2d Sess 47 (1986)
(written statement of former SEC Chairman John S.R. Shad).
21. See generally 1 Barriers to Takeovers in the European Community App C (1989) (study prepared
by Coopers & Lybrand for the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry summarizing
technical and structural barriers to takeovers in the EEC's Member States).
22. See Amended Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, Concerning
Take-Over and Other General Bids, art 8, 1990 OJ (C 240) 7 (the "Takeover Directive"). For a
general discussion of the Takeover Directive, see Lois Moore, The EC's Proposed Takeover Directives,
NYU LJ 1 (May 28, 1991). Recent reports suggest that the Takeover Directive has met with strong
opposition from Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, and that its eventual adoption
is uncertain. See, for example, Andrew Hill, Brussels Worried About Slow Passage of 1992 Laws, Fin
Times 13 (Sept 13, 1991) (concluding that the Takeover Directive is unlikely to be adopted in 1991).
Countries that are not members of the EEC have also taken tentative steps toward eliminating some
of their restrictions on the foreign ownership of shares. See, for example, Christione de Senarclens,
Switzerland: Revision of CorporationLaw, 19 Intl Bus L 271 no 5 (May 1991) (discussing proposals in
Switzerland to eliminate blanket restrictions on the foreign ownership of registered shares of Swiss
companies).
23. See, for example, David J. Berger, European M&A Activity Is On An Upward Swing, Manhattan
Law 12 (April 1991) (predicting continued growth in mergers and acquisitions activity in continental
Europe).
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24
disclosure to foreign agencies of information regarding their accounts.
Internationalization also may result in insider trading if foreign investors
persist in engaging in conduct that, although permitted in their home
25
markets, violates the laws of other countries.
The United States has responded to these trends by increasing the
resources devoted to the investigation and prosecution of transnational
insider trading cases. 2 6 In turn, the SEC's vigorous application of insider
trading laws to transactions originating abroad has given foreign countries an
incentive to examine their own law enforcement efforts. 2 7 Furthermore,
although the United States cannot dictate the securities laws of other nations,
the SEC has exerted pressure on countries to prohibit insider dealing and to
provide the Commission with information in insider trading cases. 2 8
Switzerland's adoption of legislation criminalizing insider trading in 1988
provides one example of a nation responding to pressures from the United
States. 29 For years prior to the enactment of article 161 of the Swiss Penal
Code, the SEC had sought, with mixed success, to obtain evidence from Swiss
banks during investigations of foreign-based trading. 30 Although in some
cases the SEC succeeded in obtaining information pursuant to the terms of a
Memorandum of Understanding negotiated with the Swiss government in
1982, 3 1 the lack of a statutory ban on insider trading in Switzerland limited
the SEC's ability to take advantage of other law enforcement treaties between
24. See Harvey L. Pitt, David B. Hardison & Karen L. Shapiro, Problems of Enforcement in the
Multinational Securities Market, 3 Selected Articles on Federal Securities Law 322, 329-33 (American
Bar Association, section of Business Law, 1991).
25. See, for example, Lori Hawkins, Mexico Faces Problems with Insider Trading, Reuters Bus Rep
(May 16, 1991) (discussing current efforts in Mexico to educate securities professionals about the
insider trading laws of Mexico and the United States following an insider trading case filed against a
Mexican executive in connection with the proposed takeover of a U.S. corporation).
26. See Reauthorization for the Securities and Exchange Commission, 1992-94, Hearing before
the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
102d Cong, 1st Sess 22 (July 25, 1991) (testimony of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission, requesting further increases in resources available to
the SEC for international enforcement and assistance initiatives).
27. See, for example, Insider Trading Probes Having Global Domino Effect, Chicago Trib N13 (March
5, 1989) (quoting Professors Louis Loss of Harvard and William Tyson of the University of
Pennsylvania as stating that Wall Street insider trading scandals caused many foreign governments to
toughen standards).
28. See, for example, Houle, Survey of National Legislation Regulating Insider Trading, 9 Mich YB Intl
Legal Stud 209 (1988) (foreign governments are enacting, or considering the adoption of, insider
trading legislation, "[i]n part as a response to pressure from the U.S. government").
29. Swiss Law Prohibiting Insider Trading, Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (StGB), Swiss Penal
Code, art. 161.
30. See, for example, SEC v Katz, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
92,867 at 94,226 (SD NY Aug 7, 1986) (alleged insider trading in securities of RCA through the
Geneva branch of the Union Bank of Switzerland); SEC v Certain Unknown Purchasers of the Common
Stock, and Call Optionsfor the Common Stock of Santa Fe Int 'l Co., [ 1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur
98,323 at 92,025 (SD NY Oct 26, 1981) (suspected insider trading through Swiss
L Rptr (CCH)
banks prior to announcement of proposed merger between Santa Fe and Kuwait Petroleum Corp.);
SEC v Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 FRD 111 (SD NY 1981) (investigation of orders placed by Swiss
bank to purchase securities on the New York and Philadelphia Stock Exchanges).
31. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Switzerland (Aug 31, 1982) ("Swiss MOU"). In one insider trading case, the
SEC obtained disclosure of the identity of a Swiss banking customer under the Swiss MOU within six
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the United States and Switzerland. In particular, the Treaty between the
United States and the Swiss Confederation on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters ("Swiss-U.S. Treaty") 32 provides that assistance is available only with
respect to offenses deemed criminal in both countries. Because the SEC was
allowed to gather evidence under the Swiss-U.S. Treaty only if it could
demonstrate that inside information had been tipped to third parties, 33 the
"dual criminality" requirement severely curtailed the SEC's ability to obtain
information during the preliminary stage of an investigation. 34 Switzerland's
adoption of article 161, with the strong encouragement of the United States,
eliminated this impediment to the SEC's efforts to obtain evidence from Swiss
banks. 3 5 Similarly, Japan is reported to have strengthened its prohibitions on
36
insider trading largely at the urging of the United States.
In addition, the United States exerts indirect pressure on other countries
to curb insider trading abuses. First, the SEC continues to bring high-profile
enforcement actions involving foreign-based insider trading. 3 7 Second, the
months after first approaching the SBA with a request. See SEC v Katz, Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
92,867 at 94,226.
32. Mutual Assitance in Criminal Matters, [1976] 27 UST Part 2 (1973).
33. Under Swiss law prior to 1988, a corporate insider did not violate the law by trading
securities on the basis of material, nonpublic information solely for his or her own account. The
disclosure of confidential business information to third parties, however, gave rise to potential
liability under article 162 of the Swiss Penal Code. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems of
Enforcement at 346 (cited in note 24).
34. The SEC's experience in the Santa Fe case, which occurred before Switzerland criminalized
insider trading, illustrates this point. The SEC first submitted a request for assistance under the
treaty on March 22, 1982. On January 26, 1983, the Swiss Federal Court denied the request, on
grounds that it failed to demonstrate that the facts, as alleged, would have violated Swiss law. See 22
ILM 785 (1983). The SEC renewed its request on July 27, 1983, at which time it introduced
additional facts suggesting that the conduct under investigation constituted a violation of thencurrent Swiss law. After the SEC made this showing, the Swiss Federal Court granted the
Commission's request in an unpublished opinion dated May 16, 1984, although the actual
production of evidence was delayed an additional nine months as a result of further appeals of the
court's decision to grant access. See Michael D. Mann, Anne H. Sullivan & Teresa A. Koncick,
Current Issues in International Securities Law Enforcement 43-45 (Jan 10, 1987) (paper prepared for
American Bar Association's Institute on International Litigation and Arbitration).
35. See Note, Swiss Law ProhibitingInsider Trading: Its Impact on Switzerland and the United States, 16
BrooklynJ Intl L 379, 391 (1990) (authored by Catherine E. Donahue) (noting that "each treaty or
agreement between Switzerland and the United States lay the groundwork for the Swiss law
criminalizing insider trading").
36. See, for example, Michael Hughes, Insider Trading Like Polygamy-Depends Where You Do It,
Reuters Bus Rep (March 27, 1989) (quoting Japanese broker as stating that Japan upgraded criminal
penalties for insider trading in response to pressure from the United States). The ability of the
United States to force other countries to prohibit insider trading and provide information to the SEC
should not be exaggerated. Indeed, Congress has criticized the Commission for allegedly failing to
investigate suspected insider trading originating abroad where "the United States does not have an
information-sharing agreement and/or the Commission has had problems obtaining information...
in the past due to bank secrecy and blocking laws." Suspicious Trades at 18 (cited in note 14).
37. See, for example, SEC v Certain Purchasers of Common Stock and Call Option Contracts for the
Common Stock of Contel Corp., No 90 Civ 4636 (CSH) (SD NY July 13, 1990) (SEC alleged insider
trading immediately prior to public announcement of proposed acquisition of Contel by GTE Corp.
through foreign banks and brokerage firms); SEC v Marcour, No 90 Civ 1930 (JPG) (D DC June 14,
1990) (SEC alleged insider trading in stock of Apollo Computer Inc. by German resident employed
by Apollo's wholly-owned German subsidiary); SEC v Godfrey, No 90 Civ 1962 (RJW) (SD NY March
22, 1990) (SEC alleged insider trading by manager of Inter-Continental Hotels subsidiary of Grand
Metropolitan Plc. in connection with the British company's 1988 acquisition of Pillsbury); SEC v
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SEC often discovers information suggesting breaches of the laws of other
countries during its investigations of suspected violations of the U.S.
securities laws. Where the SEC has provided compelling evidence of insider
trading or other market abuses to foreign authorities, those authorities have
had a strong incentive to investigate and file charges. 38 Third, the SEC has
supported legislation to authorize the Commission to conduct investigations
on behalf of foreign regulators in the United States, 39 and has continued to
°
negotiate new information-sharing agreements with foreign governments.4
In short, much of the pressure brought to bear on foreign governments by the
SEC consists of "regulation by example."
C.

Technological Developments

Conventional wisdom holds that rapid advances in telecommunications,
combined with the multiple listing of securities and the resulting potential for
twenty-four-hour trading, vastly increase the opportunities for insider
trading. 4 1 As long as surveillance mechanisms lag behind technological
42
developments, the conventional wisdom is undoubtedly correct.
Advances in technology, however, also open the door to more effective
surveillance techniques. In particular, a number of foreign stock exchanges
have recently acquired sophisticated trading systems that include electronic
audit

trails. 4 3

Technological

innovations

thus

facilitate

the

efforts

of

FinacorAnstalt and Certain Purchasersof Call Option Contractsfor the Common Stock of Combustion Engineering,
Inc., No 89 Civ 7667 (JMC) (SD NY Nov 16, 1989) (SEC alleged insider trading by Liechtensteinbased entity in connection with acquisition of Combustion Engineering by Swiss-based company).
38. For example, in 1987 the SEC alerted the Department of Trade and Industry to potential
violations of the laws of the United Kingdom involving Guinness Plc.'s takeover of Distillers Co.,
based on information obtained during the investigation of Ivan Boesky in the United States. See, for
example, Terry Garrett, Mounting a Counterattack to U.K. Trading Abuses, Mergers & Acquisitions 64,
64-66 (July/Aug 1987). More recently, the SEC is believed to have set in motion an investigation by
French authorities of suspected insider trading in the stock of U.S.-based Triangle Industries
immediately prior to its acquisition by Pechiney S.A., a state-owned metals group. See, for example;
Insider Trading Probes Having Global Domino Effect, Chicago Trib N13 (March 5, 1989) (discussing the
COB's probe of pre-announcement trading in Triangle shares).
39. See, for example, § 6 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988,
Pub L No 100-704, 102 Stat 4677 (1988) (creating new § 21(a)(2) of the Exchange Act authorizing
the SEC to conduct investigations in the United States of persons and institutions suspected of
violations of foreign securities laws).
40. See Michael D. Mann &Joseph G. Mari, Developments in InternationalSecurities Law Enforcement
62-78 (February 13, 1990) (paper prepared for Practising Law Institute's Securities Enforcement
Institute discussing MOUs and other information-sharing agreements).
41. See, for example, Note, Icarus and His Waxen Wings: CongressAttempts to Address the Challenges of
Insider Trading in a Globalized Securities Market, 23 VandJ Transnati L 99, 105 (1990) (authored by John
Thornell Thomas).
42. See, for example, Exchange Act Rel No 21958, 32 SEC Docket 1241, 1252 (April 18, 1985)
(noting that "[tihere are few surveillance mechanisms in place to safeguard the integrity of securities
trading conducted simultaneously in multiple international markets"); Craig Forman, Old World
Traditions Include Insider Trading, Wall StJ CI col 3 (Feb 8, 1989) (stating that "[c]omputerized trails
on trading activity are rare [in Europe] because in many European markets, prices still are written on
blackboards and trades are scribbled on scraps of paper").
43. See, for example, Mexico to Purchase Vancouver Stock Exchange Computerized Trading System, PR
Newswire (July 22, 1991) (announcing sale of computerized trading system to Mexican Stock
Exchange that would include electronic linkage between trading and surveillance functions); Don
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regulators to detect violations that previously went unobserved. While it
remains to be seen whether regulators abroad will take full advantage of their
new capabilities, technological developments should permit foreign
authorities to enforce laws against insider trading more vigorously.
III
SURVEY OF FOREIGN INSIDER TRADING LAWS

This section profiles the laws of five countries to illustrate the range of
approaches that different jurisdictions have adopted to address perceived
insider trading abuses. It examines the laws of two European countries
(France and Germany), two Pacific-region countries (Australia and Japan),
and one developing nation (Mexico).
The discussion of each country addresses the circumstances that gave rise
to restrictions on insider dealing, the content of the insider trading
prohibitions, and the enforcement of the laws. The analysis focuses on the
laws that specifically prohibit insider trading, although in theory other laws
might be invoked to combat the practice. In comparison to the United States,
however, where insider trading is prosecuted primarily under a general
antifraud provision, 44 other nations generally have opted to enact specific
prohibitions on insider dealing.
A.

Australia

Australia has regulated insider trading since the early 1970s. Prosecutors
have brought numerous cases under the insider trading laws, but have been
hindered by Australia's complex statutory scheme, as well as by judicial
reluctance to enforce the statute. 45 In June 1991, Australia revised its insider
46
trading statute and increased the penalties for insider dealing.
1. Background. As in the United States, concern with insider dealing in
Australia has intensified during periods of active takeover activity and
economic prosperity. 47 Legislation restricting insider trading was first
adopted in 1970, 4 8 but failed to stem criticisms of the extent of insider trading
in Australia. 49 More detailed insider trading legislation was adopted in
1980,50 but it failed to provide a significant deterrent to insider trading; a
Lewis Kirk, West Germany: Capital Markets Take Up the Global Challenge, Institutional Investor S1 (Jan

1990) (discussing development of new centralized data center for Germany's eight stock exchanges).
44. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 USC § 78j(b) (1988) ("Exchange Act").
45. Roman Tomasic, Insider Trading Law Reform in Australia, Company & Sec L J 121 (June 1991).
46. Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (effective date Aug 1, 1991).
47.

Legislative Panel Callsfor Insider Trading Law Changes, Intl Sec Reg Rep 7 (Dec 6, 1989).

48. Section 75A of the Securities Industry Act 1970 No 35 1201 (NSW).
49. Tomasic, Insider Trading Law Reform at 121 (cited in note 45) (discussing study published by
the Senate Select Committee on Securities and Exchange in 1974).
50. See § 128 of the Securities Industry Act 1980 ("SIA"). This section was subsequently
recodified as § 1002 of the Corporations Act of 1989. See James D. Cox, An Outsider's Perspective of
Insider Trading Regulation in Australia, 12 Sydney L Rev 455, 463 (March 1990).
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1988 survey of market participants concluded that "the incidence of insider
trading in Australia ranges between 'not uncommon' and 'widespread.' -51
Reflecting continued concerns that widespread insider trading in Australia
was making the nation's markets unattractive to foreign investors and was
discouraging small investors from investing in securities, 52 in February 1989,
the Attorney General requested that the House of Representatives Standing
Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (the "Griffiths Committee")
study the extent of insider trading and other forms of market manipulation in
Australia. 53 The committee issued its report in October 1989, which
concluded that "corporate spiders" were able to engage in insider trading in
Australia "with little risk of prosecution or conviction." 54 The report
proposed a number of revisions to Australia's insider trading law, including a
broader definition of an "insider" and increased penalties for insider dealing.
The Federal Government largely endorsed the committee's recommendations
and enacted revised legislation in June 1991.
2. Content of Insider Trading Law. As amended in June 1991, the
Corporations Law prohibits an insider-a person who possesses material,
nonpublic information concerning a company's securities-from engaging in
securities transactions, if he or she knows or should know that the information
is not generally available and might have a material effect on the price or value
of the securities if made public. 5 5 The act also makes it illegal for the insider
to procure other persons to trade on his behalf.5 6

In addition, the law

contains an "anti-tipping" provision: an insider shall not directly or indirectly
communicate material, nonpublic information concerning a company's
securities to another person if the insider knows or should know that the other
person would likely engage in securities transactions or procure a third
57
person to buy or sell securities on his behalf.

Prior to the June 1991 amendments, the Australian statute did not permit
the imposition of liability on corporations for insider trading. As amended,
however, the act provides that a "body corporate" will be deemed to possess
information that is known by an officer of the corporation and that he or she
came to possess in the course of official duties. 58 The statute further provides
that a body corporate is presumed to be aware of information that an officer
51.

Roman Tomasic & Brendan Pentony, Insider Trading, 14 Legal Serv Bulletin 3, 4 (Feb 1989).

52.

Id.

53.

The principal exchange in Australia is located in Sydney, although exchanges are also

located in each of the other five state capitals (Adelaide, Brisbane, Hobart, Melbourne, and Perth).
54.

Griffiths Committee, Fair Sharesfor All: Insider Trading in Australia (Oct 1989).

55. Section 1002G of the Corporations Law. Section 1002B of the Corporations Law sets forth
the circumstances in which information will be deemed "generally available." Section 1002C, in
turn, provides that a reasonable person should expect that information will have a material effect on
the price or value of a company's securities if "the information would, or would be likely to, influence
persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether or not to subscribe for, buy or sell
the first-mentioned securities."
56. Id at § 1002G(2)(b).
57. Id at § 1002G(3).
58. Id at § 1002E(a).

Page 199: Autumn 1992]

RESPONSE TO INSIDER TRADING

of the corporation knows, or ought reasonably to know, because he or she is
an officer of the corporation. 5 9 These provisions, however, do not prevent a
company from engaging in securities transactions if it employs "Chinese
Wall" procedures which insulate the purchaser or seller of securities at the
corporate level from price-sensitive information, 6 0 or if the securities
transactions relate to a corporate transaction with another company. 6 '
The Corporations Law contains several affirmative defenses. A person
accused of insider trading may avoid liability by establishing that the
information received was broadly disseminated. 6 2 In addition, a defendant
may seek to establish that the person on the opposite side of the transaction
knew, or ought reasonably to have known, the price-sensitive information
63
before entering into the transaction.
Violations of the insider trading law 64 by individuals are punishable by
fines of $200,000 (Australian) and/or imprisonment for five years. The
65
penalty for violations by corporations is currently $1 million.
3. Enforcement. Under the statutory scheme that existed in Australia during
the 1980s, responsibility for the enforcement of the insider trading laws was
divided between the National Companies and Securities Commission (the
"NCSC") and the Corporate Affairs Commissions of the various states. 66
Although its name suggests otherwise, the NCSC reported to the state
governments. The agency had both a small staff and limited resources;
during its 1988 fiscal year, the NCSC had a budget of less than $6 million and
approximately 85 employees. 6 7 In January 1991, the NCSC was replaced by
the Australian Securities Commission (the "ASC"), which reports to the
68
federal government and operates with a substantially larger budget.
In the past, however, the primary obstacle to the effective enforcement of
the insider trading prohibitions in Australia has not been the size of the
NCSC's budget, but rather the technical requirements of the statute and the
hostile reception of Australian courts to attempts by prosecutors to bring
59. Id at § 1002E(b).
60. Id at § 1002M.
61. Id at § 1002Q. The provision is apparently intended to clarify that a corporation intending
to acquire another corporation or otherwise acquire or dispose of its securities will not be deemed to
have engaged in insider trading.
62. Id at § 1000T(2)(a).
63. Id at § 1000T(2)(b).
64. Id at § 1002G.
65. A separate provision of the Corporations Law authorizes a private right of action on behalf
of any person who enters into a prohibited transaction with an insider, if such person can establish
the difference between the price paid or received for the securities and the price which would have
prevailed had the information been generally available. See id at § 1013(3)-(4). This provision
predates theJune 1991 amendments to the Corporations Law and has rarely been invoked by private
investors. See Cox, Outsider's Perspective at 476-77 (cited in note 50).
66. Cox, 12 Sydney L Rev at 475 (cited in note 50).
67. Id at 475.
68. Kevin Brown, Australian Watchdog Given Teeth, Fin Times 125 (June 21, 1991) (reporting that
the ASC will have a budget ten times as large as the NCSC).
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insider trading cases. Indeed, not a single criminal conviction for insider
69
dealing was secured during the 1980s.
The 1991 revisions to the Corporations Law simplified the law in several
important respects. 70 It is too early to conclude that these amendments will
lead to successful prosecutions in Australia for insider dealing, although
recent developments suggest that the pieces may finally be in place for more
7
effective enforcement. '
B. France
Although insider trading has enjoyed a long tradition in France,
restrictions on insider trading and the penalties for insider dealing have
increased over the past two decades. The most significant development in
recent years was the enhancement of the investigative powers of the
Commission des Operations de Bourse (the "COB"), the French counterpart
to the SEC.
1. Background. The origins of the current French legislation on insider
trading are found in the ordinance of September 28, 1967 (the "Ordinance"),
which created the COB and, as part of a broader set of disclosure-oriented
initiatives, required that directors and officers of French corporations report
their securities transactions to the COB. As the COB's small staff was unable
to process the insider reports that the Ordinance required to be filed, the
COB advocated legislation to replace the reporting requirement with a
69. See, for example, Australian Insider Trading Bill To Be Introduced in ParliamentSoon, 23 Sec Reg
& L Rep 771 (BNA) (May 17, 1991) (noting that "no successful criminal prosecution of an insider
trading case has occurred in Australia thus far"). Two recent cases illustrate the hurdles faced by
prosecutors in Australia. In !989, the Corporate Affairs Department in Western Australia charged
Terrence Wheeler with insider trading under § 128 of the SIA. Wheeler was managing director of
Genanalysis, a company which analyzed mineral samples for other companies. After analyzing
samples that contained high grades of gold that had been supplied to Genanalysis by Parmelia
Resources N.L., Wheeler purchased shares of Parmelia and an affiliated company. Following public
disclosure of the mineral analysis, Parmelia's stock price "went for a spectacular run." Tomasic,
Insider Trading Law Reform at 123 (cited in note 45). The Western Australian Crown Solicitor's Office
dismissed the prosecution, however, on the grounds that there was no evidence to support the
conclusion that Wheeler was "connected" with Parmelia, as then required by section 128. Id at 124.
In a more recent case, the government charged Charles Claudianos with illegally tipping his
brother John with respect to the shares of Rancoo, a company listed on the Hobart and Melbourne
exchanges, shortly before Rancoo announced that it was entering into a joint venture with
Claudianos's employer to develop vaccines. Id at 124-25. Rancoo's share price increased from $1.05
to $2.50 during the ten-day period after the joint venture was announced. Id. The magistrate in the
case dismissed the prosecution on the grounds that there was no direct evidence that Charles
Claudianos had tipped his brother. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital
Territory held that the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish liability but nevertheless
declined to reinstate the prosecution. Myers v Claudianos, (1990) 2 ACSR 73.
70. Most significantly, liability for insider trading is no longer limited to persons "connected
with a body corporate," as § 128 of the SIA had required. See § 1002G of the Corporations Law.
71. In addition to the establishment of the ASC and the adoption of new insider trading
legislation, the Australian Stock Exchange ("ASX") has upgraded its surveillance capabilities. SeeJ.
Berry & G. Yanco, Enter the ASX Computer Police: How an Electronic Eye Spots the Villains, J Sec Inst of
Australia 2-5 (March 1990) (discussing more vigorous monitoring of suspected insider trading on the
ASX).
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prohibition against insider trading. 72 The French Parliament enacted
legislation along the lines recommended by the COB in 1970. 73 Since its
adoption, article 10-1 has been amended on several occasions in response to
perceived weaknesses in its operation.
2. Content of Insider Trading Law. As amended, the Ordinance prohibits
insiders from trading in securities while in possession of privileged
information not yet disclosed to the public. The basic prohibition applies to
trading by two categories of persons: directors, officers, and key executives of
any public company and their spouses; and persons who possess privileged
information "as a result of the exercise of their profession or
responsibilities."

74

The Ordinance governs trading by insiders while in possession of
"privileged information on the prospects or situation of an issuer or to future
movements in the price of a security." Although the Ordinance does not
contain a materiality requirement, COB regulations define "privileged
information" as "non-public, specific information .

.

. which, if made public,

could have an impact on the price" of the security. 75 In addition, the courts
have required prosecutors to establish that the information in question is
"precise, specific and certain." 76
When first adopted in 1970, the Ordinance did not address the tipping of
privileged information or tippee liability. Article 10-1 has since been
amended, however, to prohibit insiders from "knowingly allowing" third
parties to trade on privileged information. In addition, insiders may not
communicate privileged information to third parties "outside the normal
purview of [their] profession or functions." COB regulations supplement
these provisions by providing that persons shall not trade on the basis of
privileged information that originated either directly or indirectly from an
77
insider.
The Ordinance initially failed to impose penalties on corporations for
insider trading. Amendments to article 10-1 in 1983 addressed this disparity,
in part, by providing that corporate officers of a legal entity that engages in a
prohibited transaction are criminally liable for the violation. Neither the
72. Barry A. K. Rider & H. Leigh Ffrench, The Regulation of Insider Trading 235 (Oceana, 1979).
73. Law No 70-1208 of December 23, 1970 (adding new article 10-1 to the Ordinance).
74. Article 10-1 of the Ordinance (as amended by Law No 83-1 of Jan 3, 1983, art 35).
Regulations adopted by the COB have construed this language broadly, as have the French courts.
See Reglement No 90-08 Relatif a L'Utilisation D'Une Information Privilegiee, JO 8600 (July 20,
1990) ("Regulation 90-08"). See also Docouloux-Favard, Dix ans de jurisprudence et d'activite de la
commission des operations de bourse, 104 GP 419 (Sept/Oct 1984) (noting that the Ordinance had been
deemed applicable to temporary administrators or bankruptcy receivers, stock brokers and bank
employees, a government official who obtained information from a corporation in his official
capacity, and an architect who observed the chairman of the company for which he was working meet
with the chairman of another corporation and surmised that a rumored joint venture would take
place).
75. Regulation 90-08, art 1.
76. See, for example, CompagnieFrancaised'Entreprise, 1978 JCP II, No 18789) (Cour d'appel, May
26, 1977).
77. Regulation 90-08, art 5.
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Ordinance nor regulations adopted by the COB, however, impose liability on
corporations for insider trading violations by their employees.7 8
Violations of article 10-1 of the Ordinance may result in criminal penalties.
The Ordinance authorizes fines ranging from FF 6000 to 10 million, or ten
times the profits made, and/or terms of imprisonment ranging from two
months to two years. Tipping violations are subject to fines of FF 10,000 to
79
100,000 and/or, terms of imprisonment ranging from one to six months.
3. Enforcement. The COB is responsible for investigating suspected
violations of the ordinance, although public prosecutors handle actual
criminal prosecutions. In the past, the COB has been constrained by its
limited resources.8 0 The COB's investigatory powers were also narrowly
circumscribed. 8 ' As a result of these limitations, the COB referred only a
82
small fraction of the matters under investigation to public prosecutors.
While successful prosecutions have led to fines, few, if any, defendants have
actually been imprisoned for insider trading, although others have received
83
suspended sentences.
Two highly-publicized insider trading investigations in 1988 prompted a
reexamination of the COB's limited enforcement powers. First, the SEC
advised the COB of substantial trading activity originating in France three
days prior to the announcement that Pechiney S.A., a state-owned metals
84
group, was launching a friendly takeover of U.S.-based Triangle Industries.
78. Commentators have characterized the lack of secondary liability for corporations under
French law as a "serious deficiency." Rider & Ffrench at 235 (cited in note 72).
79. See Law No 89-531 of August 2, 1989, arts 7-8 (amending article 10-1 of the Ordinance). In
addition, pursuant to authority granted in 1989, the COB is authorized to impose a fine on persons
who engage in practices which have the effect of distorting the operation of the market or
jeopardizing investors' equal access to information and investment opportunities. The fine may not
exceed the greater of FF 10 million or 10 times the profit realized as a result of the violation. See id
at art 5 (creating new article 9-2 of the Ordinance).
80. For example, in 1985, the COB employed but seven investigators, who were responsible not
only for handling suspected cases of insider trading, but also for reviewing financial statements and
monitoring the mutual fund industry. Robert Bordeaux-Groult, Problems of Enforcement and Cooperation
in the Multinational Securities Market: A French Perspective, 9 U Pa J Intl Bus L 453, 455 (1987).
81. For example, the COB could not subpoena documents from the general public but only
from stock market professionals. While the agency could summon any person suspected of having
information relevant to a pending inquiry to provide testimony, it had no power to sanction
individuals who refused to comply with its requests. Id at 457.
82. The COB conducted approximately 350 investigations between 1983 and 1988 but made
only 30 referrals for prosecution. See Astrid R. Baumgardner, SEC/COB Agreements: The French
Perspective, NY LJ 5 (June 21, 1990). Even where the COB made referrals, the high standard of proof
required in criminal cases created a substantial hurdle. In the absence of substantial, direct evidence
that the persons accused of insider trading had received privileged information prior to trading, the
courts were reluctant to impose criminal penalties. See, for example, 1986 GP 459 (Trib gr inst May
13, 1986) (acquitting defendants who traded in securities of defense contractor Thomson C.S.F.
shortly before announcement that company had signed major contract with Saudi Arabia); 1976JCP
II, No 18496 (Trib gr inst March 17, 1976) (acquitting, for lack of sufficient proof, corporate
secretary who sold shares of issuer's securities five days before board meeting at which company's
poor financial condition was discussed).
83. James Lightburn, Insider Trading in France, Intl Fin L Rev 23, 24 (Jan 1988).
84. Thomas Kamm, Four Firms Are Said To Be Scrutinized In Alleged Insider Trading In Triangle, Wall
StJ C14 col 5 (Dec 22, 1988).
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In addition, allegations of insider trading arose in connection with the
attempted takeover of Societ6 Generale, a prominent French bank, by persons
85
associated with the government.
Although the COB referred criminal charges to the public prosecutors in
both cases, the Triangle and Societ6 Generale inquiries led to demands for
the French government to increase the COB's resources and investigatory
powers. As a result, the COB now has an annual budget of approximately FF
100 million and a staff of 200, which pales in comparison with the SEC, but
represents a major increase over prior years. 86 In addition, amendments to
the ordinance have improved the COB's ability to subpoena documents and
87
testimony from persons believed to have information relevant to an inquiry,
and have authorized fines of FF 15,000 to 2 million and/or a term of
imprisonment ranging from fifteen days to two years for persons who obstruct
a COB investigation. 88 The amendments also empower the COB to issue
cease-and-desist orders to enjoin violations of its regulations, as well as to levy
civil fines against persons found to have violated COB regulations. 8 9
Recent indications suggest that the COB is beginning to take advantage of
its new powers. In 1990, the COB conducted seventy-five investigations
(compared with fifty-two during 1989), approximately one-third of which
involved allegations of insider dealing. Of fifteen cases referred to public
90
prosecutors, nine involved insider trading.
C.

Germany

According to one tongue-in-cheek observer, the German approach to
insider trading illustrates "the Bauhaus principle of 'Less Is More.' -91 For
the past twenty years, Germany has eschewed governmental regulation,
relying instead upon a system of voluntary guidelines to address insider
dealing. The release of the EEC Insider Trading Directive, combined with a
series of recent stock market scandals, however, has led Germany to the verge
of adopting legislation formally banning insider trading.
1. Background. Several explanations have been offered for the lack of
concern with insider trading in Germany. One scholar observed that the role
of the equity markets in Germany has historically been limited, and that only
sophisticated investors able to protect their own interests without
85. E.S. Browling, France Wants 5 To Be Charged In Insider Case, Wall Stj Ail col4 (May31, 1990).
86. Looking at Clouseau, The Economist 92 (May 19, 1990).
87. Law No 89-531 Regarding the Security and Transparency of the Financial Market, art 2 (Aug
2, 1989) (amending article 5B of the Ordinance).
88. Id art 6 (amending article 10 of the Ordinance).
89. Id art 5 (incorporated as articles 9-1 and 8-1 of the Ordinance).
90. More Than Half of Investigations Involve Foreign Business, COB Says, Intl Sec Reg Rep 3 (July 1,
1991) (noting that COB's annual report stated that largest category of cases referred to public
prosecutors involved insider trading).
91. Presiegfried H. Elsing & Donna Shook-Wiercimok, New German Insider Trading Regulations,
Intl Fin L Rev 30 (Oct 1988) (cartoon accompanying article).
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governmental intervention have participated in the stock markets.9 2 Officials
have also suggested that the dearth of mergers and acquisitions in Germany
presents fewer opportunities for insider trading than are available in other
industrial nations.9 3 Others have claimed that legal restrictions on insider
trading would be impractical in light of the typically close relationships
between German banks and corporations.9 4 According to one official,
"American-style rules against insider trading would miss the point" because
"an organized insider situation" exists in Germany. 9 5
Despite claims that prohibitions on insider trading would be unnecessary
or impractical, demands for restrictions on insider dealing have surfaced
periodically in Germany. In the late 1960s, prompted by concern over the low
level of participation by German citizens in the stock market, the Federal
Minister of Economics established a commission of stock exchange experts to
study reforms. Although the panel concluded that restrictions on insider
trading would play "a significant role" in promoting "confidence in the
orderly transaction of stock exchange business," it declined to recommend
the adoption of civil or criminal penalties for insider trading.9 6 Instead, at the
behest of the business community, the government endorsed a series of
voluntary insider trading Guidelines (the "Guidelines") as an alternative to
federal legislation.9 7 The Guidelines were adopted in 1970 and amended in
1976 and 1988.
2. Content of Insider Trading Guidelines. In their current form, the Guidelines
do not have the force of law. Instead, German banks and stock corporations
agree to require their employees (and other agents with access to inside
information) to submit to the Guidelines as a term of employment. 9 8

92. See, for example, Blum, 7 NwJ Intl L & Bus at 513 (cited in note 15).
93. Paul Johnston, West Germany's Gentlemen's Approach to Insider Dealing, Reuters Bus Rep (Dec 21,
1987) (quoting Chief Executive of the West German Federation of Stock Exchanges).
94. Under Germany's system of "universal banking," banks provide retail banking, commercial
lending, investment banking, and stock brokerage services to their customers. In addition, banks
own significant stakes in German companies and are often represented on their supervisory (nonmanagement) boards. See 2 Barriers to Takeovers at 13 (cited in note 21).
95. West Germany's Gentlemen's Approach to Insider Dealing, Reuters Bus Rep (Dec 21, 1987).
96. Blum, 7 Nw J Intl L Bus at 516 (cited in note 15) (quoting and translating Insider handelsRichtlinien (Insider Trading Guidelines), reprinted in Rodrian Bruns, Wertpapier und B6rse § 436
(Schmidt, 1976) ("Guidelines").
97. Klaus J. Hopt, The German Insider Trading Guidelines-Spring-Gunor Scarecrow?, 8 J Comp Bus &
Cap Mkt L 381, 382 (1986).
98. Stock corporations that have not agreed to abide by the Guidelines are identified with a
special notation on the quotation lists published by the German exchanges. See Federation of
German Stock Exchanges' Insider Rules 5 (July 1988).
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Under the Guidelines, persons deemed "insiders" 9 9 are not permitted to
engage in transactions in "insider securities" 0 0 based on the use of "insider
information" obtained in the course of their employment.' 0 ' "Insider
information" is defined as "knowledge of circumstances not yet disclosed or
10 2
publicly known which could affect the valuation of the insider securities."'
Insiders are also prohibited from procuring others to trade on their behalf
or passing insider information to persons who are not insiders, unless
required by law or a valid business purpose.' 0 3 Tippees, however, are not
themselves subject to the Guidelines unless they have agreed to abide by the
Guidelines as a condition of employment.
3. Enforcement. Suspected violations of the Guidelines are investigated by a
five-member Board of Inquiry established by each of the German stock
exchanges. 10 4 The conduct of investigations is governed by procedural rules
adopted shortly after the Guidelines were introduced. 10 5 In the event that a
violation is found, the Board of Inquiry informs the corporation, as well as the
Federal Minister of Economics. The sole remedy authorized is the
disgorgement of any trading profits to the corporation. If the person found to
have violated the Guidelines refuses to disgorge the profits, the corporation
must bring an action in court for breach of contract, unless a "material
10 6
reason" exists not to file suit.

While investigations under the Guidelines are not uncommon, they
virtually never result in findings of wrongdoing. 0 7 The Frankfurt Board of
Inquiry did conclude in 1986, however, that a member of the supervisory
board of AEG AG, an electronics concern, had engaged in insider trading by
purchasing 700 shares of AEG prior to the public announcement of its
acquisition by Daimler-Benz AG. The Board characterized the infraction as a
99. "Insiders" include the members of the supervisory board of the corporation (as well as its
affiliates), shareholders owning more than 25% of the corporation's stock, and employees and agents
of the corporation who obtain access to insider Information in the course of their employment or
agency relationship. Guidelines § 2(1) (cited in note 96). In recognition of the close relationships
between banks and German corporations, banks and their employees are also considered "insiders"
if they receive insider information in the course of a lending relationship or while providing advisory
services. Id.
100. "Insider Securities" include, among other things, stocks, convertible bonds, warrants, and
subscription rights issued by domestic corporations and admitted for official quotation or trading on
the regulated market on a domestic stock exchange. Id at § 2(2).
101. Id at § 1.
102. A comment to the Guidelines states that it is irrelevant whether the corporation intended
that the information be treated as confidential. Instead, the sole consideration is whether the
information is available to the general public. Id at comment 2 to § 2.
103. Id at § 1.
104. Although Germany's principal stock exchange is located in Frankfurt, exchanges are also
located in Berlin, Bremen, Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Hanover, Munich, and Stuttgart.
105. Guidelines § 3 (cited in note 96) (providing that suspected violations shall be investigated
under the procedural rules established at the stock exchanges pursuant to the Guidelines and
separate rules for traders and advisers).
106. Id at §§ 4(l)-(2).
107. According to one report, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has generally conducted five to ten
insider trading investigations annually, although there is reason to believe that the number of
investigations is increasing. Sweeping Out the Stables, The Economist 15 (Aug 31, 1991).
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"minor violation" and required the insider to disgorge his profits to AEG.
More significant than the characterization of the board member's conduct,
however, was the Board's failure to detect any other insider trading, despite
the fact that, in the ten days prior to the announcement of Daimler-Benz's
offer, the price of AEG's stock surged twenty-eight percent on active
08
trading.
The lack of effective enforcement of the Guidelines to date has led one
German legal expert to conclude that they are a "toothless device."' 0 9
Indeed, Germany's reluctance to adopt formal prohibitions on insider dealing
has placed it squarely out of step with other members of the EEC. In
particular, the EEC's proposal of the insider Trading Directive in 1987 met
strong criticism in Germany, where government and stock market officials
sought to preserve the system of self-regulation."l 0
Perhaps less by choice than by compulsion, however, Germany is moving
toward legislation banning insider trading. As other Member States of the
EEC moved to implement the Insider Trading Directive even before it was
adopted in final form, Germany dropped its opposition to the proposal."'
Moreover, in the wake of a recent scandal involving the trading practices of
German banks, authorities have called not only for the passage of insider
trading legislation, but also for the creation of a federal agency charged with
2
enforcing the insider Trading Directive and other EEC initiatives. 1
D.

Japan

Most observers of the Japanese securities markets-Japanese
Japanese alike-agree that insider trading has long been
International criticism, however, as well as recent insider trading
stock market scandals prompted the Japanese Diet to amend the

and nontolerated.
and other
Securities

108. Blum, 7 NwJ Intl L & Bus at 526-27 (cited in note 15). Indeed, under the Guidelines, only
insiders connected with AEG were prohibited from trading; Daimler-Benz executives and board
members were free to buy AEG shares before the public announcement.
109. Id at 524 (citing address by University of Berlin Professor Michael Will).
110. See Johnston, Reuters Bus Rep (cited in note 93).
111. See Norma Cohen, Stephen Fidler & Tim Dickson, City Anger at EC insider Proposals, Fin
Times 24 (May 12, 1989).
112. Katharine Campbell, German Stock Scam Prompts Tighter Rules, Fin Times 3 (Sept 19, 1991)
(quoting board member of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange). The recent inquiry in Germany was
triggered by an anonymous letter to Effecten Spiegel, a financial publication, accusing an equity
warrants trader at Deutsche Bank with insider dealing. See, for example, Frank Kane, Tumbrils Roll at
Deutsche: Insider Dealing Probes at Germany's Top Bank Send Shivers Through Frankfurt, Daily Telegraph 30
(July 7, 1991). The investigation quickly ripened, however, into a broader examination of frontrunning and stock manipulation by traders at German banks, who allegedly were allowed by their
employers to engage in such practices as a means of increasing their compensation. See Katharine
Campbell, Deutsche Bank to Tighten Rules for Traders, Fin Times 25 (July 25, 1991). The resulting
negative publicity has apparently inspired Germany to redouble its efforts to enact legislation
banning insider trading by June 1992, which is the deadline established in the insider Trading
Directive. See German Insider Trading: Behind the Times, The Economist 86 (July 13, 1991).
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and Exchange Law ("SEL") l1 3 in May 1988 to define insider trading and
impose penalties.
1. Background. Japanese attitudes toward investing and the structure of the
Japanese securities markets help explain the laissez-faire approach to insider
trading in Japan. As in other countries profiled in this article, securities
transactions in Japan traditionally have been considered risky investments
appropriate only for sophisticated investors with close ties to the securities
markets."1 4 Brokers and other market professionals, in turn, were expected to
seek "inside information" as a basic service to their institutional customers." 5
Other features of the Japanese markets also make shares of stock in
Japanese companies susceptible to price manipulation and insider dealing. In
particular, Japan's business community is built around kei'retsu-horizontal and
vertical business alliances in which the participating companies have
interlocking directors and own substantial blocks of each others' shares.' 16
Because members of a keiretsu generally hold shares of affiliated companies on
a long-term basis, the public "float" of many Japanese companies is limited
and, therefore, subject to manipulation."l 7 Indeed, an entire lexicon has
developed in Japan to refer to the shares of companies whose stock prices are
manipulated by brokerage firms to benefit select customers." 18
Nevertheless, Japan concluded in 1988 that a formal ban on insider
trading was necessary." 9 Two events appear to have triggered the adoption
of the amendments to the SEL that year. First, in mid-1987, it was disclosed
that a bank had sold 337,000 shares of Tateho Chemical Industries Co., a
company to which it had made substantial loans, one day before Tateho
announced large losses. Following an investigation, the Osaka Securities
Exchange found that the bank had violated no securities laws. This
113. See Chieko Takeshita & Kazumi Okamura, Japan's Securities Markets: Regulation of Insider
Trading, 12 E Asian Exec Rep 8 (Nov 14, 1990).
114. See, for example, Note, Regulation ofInsider Trading in Japan, 89 Colum L Rev 1296, 1296
(1989) (authored by Tomoko Akashi).
115. See Larry Zaglin, Insider Trading in Japan: A Challenge to the Integration of the Japanese Equity
Market Into the Global Securities Market, 1987 Colum Bus L Rev 419, 421 (1987).
116. Carla Rappoport & Sally Solo, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, Fortune 76 (July 15, 1991).
117. See, for example, Allan Sloan, Japan's Rigged Market: The Beginning of Some Beautiful
Friendships, Washington Post D3 (July 2, 1991). On the other hand, the fact that a majority of the
shares of many Japanese corporations are in friendly hands insulates the companies from the threat
of a hostile takeover. The absence of hostile takeovers in Japan has also been cited as a factor that
accounts for the lack of concern with insider trading in Japan. See Zaglin, 1987 Colum Bus L Rev at
421 (cited in note 115).
118. See, for example, Sloan, Washington Post at D3 (cited in note 117) (Japanese brokerage
firms invest unlucky but favored customers in "ambulance stocks" and politicians in "election
stocks.").
119. The Ministry of Finance ("MOF") and the stock exchanges had previously advised securities
professionals and listed companies to take steps to avoid insider trading. See Note, 89 Colum L Rev
at 1301 (cited in note 114). Of particular import, the Tokyo Stock Exchange had warned listed
companies that insider trading by corporate insiders might violate article 58 of the SEL, a general
antifraud provision which resembles Rule lOb-5 under the Exchange Act. Nevertheless, no
prosecution for insider trading under article 58 has ever taken place in Japan. See Takeshita &
Okamura, 12 E Asian Exec Rep at 8 (cited in note 113) (stating that the failure to apply article 58 to
insider trading "reflected the . . . public attitude of tolerance toward the practice").
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conclusion, however, only reinforced the views of many observers that the
MOF and the exchanges were not yet prepared to curb insider abuses.' 20
Second, as foreign interest in the Japanese markets increased, so did criticism
that insider trading denigrated the integrity and highlighted the transparency
2
of Japan's securities markets.' '
In response, the Securities and Exchange Council, an advisory body to the
MOF, established a subcommittee in October 1987 to examine alleged insider
abuses. Based on the recommendations contained in the Council's February
1988 report to the MOF, the Japanese Diet adopted legislation to amend the
SEL by criminalizing insider trading in May 1988.122
2. Content of Insider TradingLaws. The Japanese laws against insider trading
are set forth in articles 190-2 and 190-3 of the SEL and supplemented by
MOF ordinances. The primary prohibition against insider trading is article
190-2; article 190-3 addresses more specifically illegal trading in connection
with tender offers.
Article 190-2 provides that a "corporate insider ' i 23 who obtains
knowledge of a "material fact' 2 4 related to a company listed for trading on a
Japanese exchange shall not engage in transactions in the company's
securities until the fact is made public. There is no requirement that the
insider act with a fraudulent intent. Article 190-2 also prohibits trading by
"tippees" who obtain knowledge of material facts directly from a corporate
insider. The act of tipping does not violate the statute; article 190-2 is
violated only if the tippee purchases or sells securities based on the
information provided.' 2 5 In general, subsequent tippees will not be deemed
to have violated article 190-2, unless the first tippee is considered a conduit,
26
in which case a remote tippee may be treated as the original tippee.'
Article 200 of the SEL sets forth the penalties for violating articles 190-2
and 190-3. Violations of either article are punishable by a prison term of up
120. Note, 89 Colum L Rev at 1302 (cited in note 114).
121. Takeshita & Okamura, 12 E Asian Exec Rep at 8 (cited in note 113).
122. Id at 20. The effective date of the legislation was April 1, 1989. Id.
123. "Corporate insiders" are defined to include (1) corporate officers, agents and employees; (2)
significant shareholders who obtain knowledge while exercising their statutory right to inspect the
corporation's books; (3) persons with supervisory authority over the corporation; (4) other persons
with contractual relationships with a corporation who obtain knowledge in the exercise of their
contractual duties; and (5) in the event that the person referred to by category (2) or (4) is a
corporation, the corporation's officers or agents. SEL art 190-2(1).
124. In general, a material fact relates to one of the following: (1) a strategic decision made by
corporate management; (2) the occurrence of certain events over which management has limited
control, such as damage arising from a natural disaster; .(3) material (and previously undisclosed)
changes in the corporation's sales, operating profits, or net income meeting criteria to be established
by the MOF; or (4) other material facts "relating to the management, business, or property of the
company, which may have significant influence on the investment decisions of investors." SEL art
190-2(2). Article 190-2 authorizes the MOF, by ordinance, to establish that facts which otherwise fall
within categories (1) or (2) would not be material to the investment decisions of investors. See, for
example, MOF Ordinance No 10 (Feb 3, 1989).
125. SEL art 190-2(3).
126. Note, 89 Colum L Rev at 1314 n164 (cited in note 114) (citing statement by the Director of
the MOF Securities Bureau).
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to no more than six months or a fine of not more than 500,000. In addition,
article 207 subjects a corporation to an identical fine where a representative of
the corporation violates article 190-2 or 190-3 "in connection with the
business operations or property of the corporation."
3. Enforcement. Responsibility for the enforcement of Japan's insider
trading laws is divided between the MOF and the public prosecutors. The
MOF has traditionally been viewed as a champion of Japanese securities firms
rather than as a public watchdog. The fact that the MOF prefers to issue
advice to market participants through informal communications, as opposed
27
to published rules or interpretations, reinforces this perception abroad.1
The MOF's investigatory powers are limited. Article 154 of the SEL
authorizes the MOF to order a securities exchange or a company listed on the
exchange to submit reports or data that reflect upon the health of the
exchange, but falls short of conferring the power to subpoena documents or
compel testimony for use in investigations of suspected insider trading.
Investigations conducted by public prosecutors are also hampered by a lack of
cooperation from the securities industry. 128 However, the MOF has drafted
rules governing cooperation and information-sharing with prosecutors in
insider trading cases. The MOF also has a separate inspection section within
its securities bureau to monitor suspicious stock transactions. 129
Since the adoption of articles 190-2 and 190-3 in 1988, only a handful of
cases enforcing the insider trading laws have arisen. In September 1990, a
former president of a finance company was fined I200,000 (approximately
$1,581) in connection with insider trading in the shares of a company listed
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange.13 0 More recently, Japanese prosecutors began
investigating the sale of 22,000 shares of Macross Corporation by a senior
managing director shortly before the public announcement that another
Macross officer had entered a fictitious profit into the company's accounts.' 3'
Although prosecutors have been criticized for targeting individuals on the
"financial fringe" for prosecution, 132 observers in Japan claim that the cases
have prompted Japanese corporations to encourage compliance with the new
laws. 133
WhileJapan may have hoped that the adoption of articles 190-2 and 190-3
would be viewed favorably abroad, the limited number of enforcement cases
127. See Alan L. Belier, John Palenberg & Richard M. Levine,Japanese Capital Markets: A Summary
of Selected Regulatory Developments 2 (March 15, 1991) (paper prepared for Euromoney seminar on
Japanese Capital Markets and Corporate Finance; characterizing MOF's regulatory philosophy as
"opaque" rather than "transparent").
128. Takeshita & Okamura, 12 E Asian Exec Rep at 21 (cited in note 113).
129. See, for example, LDP Approves Draft Bill on New FinancialWatchdog Body, Kyodo News Service
(Nov 26, 1991) (MOF has separate inspection sections within its Securities, Banking and
International Finance bureaus).
130. Id.
131. Robert Thomson, Offices Raided in Japanese insider Trading Probe, Fin Times 4 (May 2, 1991).
132. Id.
133. See Takeshita & Okamura, 12 E Asian Exec Rep at 21 (cited in note 113).

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 55: No. 4

brought to date suggests that "informal market practices remain far more
important than written market regulations."' I3 4 Moreover, the scandal in the
summer of 1991 involving the reimbursement of major customers against
losses by Japan's largest brokerage firms has further tarnished the
international image of the Japanese securities markets.' 3 5 These events led to
demands for the creation of an independent agency modeled after the SEC to
monitor the Japanese securities markets, 3 6 although these proposals were
rejected in favor of a semi-autonomous monitoring board subject to MOF
oversight.' 3 7 It is possible, but by no means certain, that the establishment of
this new board will lead Japanese officials to crack down more severely on
insider trading in the future.
E.

Mexico

Mexico adopted legislation prohibiting insider trading in 1983. The law
has not been vigorously enforced, but prosecutions stemming from the 1987
stock market collapse and the negotiation of a memorandum of
understanding with the SEC in 1990 indicate that stricter enforcement of the
law is contemplated.
1. Background. Although Mexico's stock exchange, La Bolsa de Valores de
Mexico, S.A. ("Bolsa"), is the largest exchange in Latin America, Mexico's
current securities laws date back only to 1975. In that year, Mexico enacted
the Securities Market Law ("SML"), which overhauled the existing statutory
scheme.' 3 8 The statute prohibited issuers from engaging in conduct designed
to manipulate stock prices, but did not originally contain a general antifraud
provision or prohibit insider trading.' 39 In 1983, article 16bis was added to
140
address the recurring problem of insider trading.
2. Content of Insider Trading Law. Article 16bis prohibits persons with access
to "privileged information" regarding an issuer from engaging in securities
134. James Sterngold,Japan: Informal Code Rules Markets, NY Times D6 col 2 (July 23, 1991).
135. See, for example, Ted Holden, et al, Japan Cleans House-Again, Business Week 26 (July 8,
1991) (stating that "the latest scandal offers fresh evidence that the bureaucrats still have a long way
to go to clean up the inbred Japanese markets").
136. See Securities Watchdog Viewed With Suspicion, Japan Times 5 (Sept 30, 1991) ("Many securities
market analysts . . .believe the establishment of an autonomous agency is the best way to prevent
future abuses."); SDP Calls for Independent Securities Watchdog, Japan Econ News Wire (Sept 1, 1991)
(noting the introduction of draft legislation by the Social Democratic Party in the Japanese Diet to
establish an independent agency responsible for monitoring the Japanese securities markets).
137. SeeJapan-Watch-DogforSecurities Market, World Accounting Rep (Oct 1991) (noting that the
MOF had successfully lobbied against recommendations by Prime Minister Kaifu's government to
establish an independent agency modeled after the SEC).
138. Samuel Wolff, An Overview of Mexico's Capital Markets and Securities Regulation, in Doing Business
in Mexico § 62.0411] (Matthew Bender 1990) ("Overview of Mexico").
139. SML art 14, § VII.
140. See, for example, Jonathan Fuerbringer, Waiting for the Other Shoe in Mexico, NY Times C13
col 3 (July 1, 1990) (analysts assert that purchasing shares on the Bolsa can be risky due to insider
trading).

Page 199: Autumn 1992]

RESPONSE TO INSIDER TRADING

transactions on their own behalf or on behalf of third parties. 14 1 "Privileged
information" is defined as information "originating from the issuer" that is
not publicly available and, if known, might have an influence on the market
142
price of the issuer's securities or those of another company.
The ban on trading set forth in article 16bis applies to corporate officers,
shareholders owning more than ten percent of an issuer's capital stock, and
persons who have obtained access to privileged information while providing
advisory or business services to an issuer.' 4 3 Persons affiliated with brokerage
houses, specialist units, stock exchanges, and depositories are also prohibited
from trading if they receive access to privileged information regarding an
issuer. 14 4 In addition, such individuals may not purchase the issuer's shares
within three months of the date of their last sale (or vice versa).' 4 5
Article l6bis does not contain an explicit "anti-tipping" provision, nor
does it address the question of tippee liability. While corporations are subject
to the law if they own more than ten percent of the capital stock of an issuer,
there are no provisions that expressly impose liability on corporations for
insider trading violations by their employees or require corporations to adopt
procedures designed to prevent insider trading by their employees.

46

1

3. Enforcement. Violations of article l6bis are treated as civil offenses. The
CNV is authorized to conduct investigations of suspected violations of the
statute and, if a breach is found, to impose administrative fines on
violators. 14 7 Before imposing any such fine, the CNV must first hold a
hearing. 148 Persons found to have misused privileged information are subject
to fines of up to twice the amount of the gains obtained, plus interest, whereas
persons found to have engaged in short-swing trading must disgorge their
profits. 14 9 Individuals harmed by violations of article 16bis are authorized to
file a civil suit in the Mexican courts, with recovery limited to twice the amount
of the insider's gains. 150 A six-month statute of limitations applies to both the
141. The statute applies only to issuers whose securities are registered with the National Registry
of Securities and Securities Brokers (the "National Registry"), a division of the Comision Nacional de
Valores ("CNV"). All securities that will be publicly offered in Mexico must be registered with the
National Registry. Overview of Mexico at § 62.03[2] (cited in note 138).
142. SML art l6bis.
143. SML art 16bis 1.
144. Id.
145. Id art 16bis 2.
146. In addition to the SML, securities professionals are subject to the regulations of the Bolsa,
which provide that brokers who engage in insider trading are subject to suspension from trading
activities. See Mexican Stockbrokers To Be Prosecutedfor Irregularities, Reuters Bus Rep (Feb 14, 1989).
147. SML art 16bis 4.
148. Id art 16bis 5.
149. Id art 16bis 4. In the event that person is found to have engaged in short-swing trading but
realized no profits, the statute authorizes the CNV to impose an alternative fine, in an amount equal
to "200 to 3000 times the minimum daily wage in force in the Federal District, depending on the
seriousness of the violation." Id.
150. Id.
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commencement of civil suits by private investors and the imposition of
administrative fines by the CNV. 15 1
Reports from Mexico suggest that insider trading remains widespread, in
part because leading brokerage houses and listed companies share common
control)15 2 Enforcement of the restrictions against insider trading, however,
53
has been limited, at least in part due to a lack of surveillance mechanisms.'
Two recent developments provide evidence that Mexico plans to cure this
deficiency. First, the Bolsa has acquired a computerized trading system from
the Vancouver Stock Exchange, which provides electronic linkage between
trading and surveillance functions.' 54 Second, the agreement signed between
the CNV and the SEC in October 19901 5 5 contemplates that the SEC will
provide the CNV with technical assistance regarding, among other things,
"systems necessary for effective market surveillance and enforcement

programs."1

56

IV
LESSONS FROM A COMPARATIVE STUDY

A comparison of the law of insider trading in the United States and the
statutes adopted in foreign countries yields several insights.

Indeed, our

analysis suggests that the United States has at least as much to learn from
developments abroad as other nations can learn from the United States.
A.

Foreign Approaches
Given their recent origin and ongoing revision, it is in some respects

premature to criticize foreign insider trading laws. Nevertheless, two features
of many of these initiatives are likely to impede their effectiveness. First,
foreign statutes often fail to create substantial penalties for insider trading or
to establish credible enforcement mechanisms. While it would be surprising
151. Id art l6bis 6.
152. For example, following the 1987 market crash, when the leading stock market index
declined 74% over 28 trading days, the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit launched a sweeping
investigation of Mexico's brokerage firms. The inquiry led to the indictment of four officials from
two of Mexico's largest brokerage firms on charges of criminal violations of the SML. See Indictments
in Mexico, NY Times D2 col 3 (Feb 20, 1989) (discussing indictment of Operadora de Bolsa SA
officials). Although the principal allegation was that the defendants had misappropriated customers'
funds and traded securities without their clients' consent, the case also focused attention on the
powerful role played in Mexico by the leading brokerage houses and the routine access of these firms
to inside information. See, for example, Tom Brown, Mexico's Free-Wheeling Stock Market Soars to New
Heights, Reuters Bus Rep (May 15, 1991) (noting that leading Mexican brokerage houses and listed
companies are frequently controlled by the same individuals, families, or business groups); Brook
Farmer, Mexico Targets Stock Market Corruption, Christian Sci Mon 4 (Feb 16, 1989).
153. See, for example, Lori Hawkins, Mexico Faces Problems with Insider Trading, Reuters Canadian
Fin Rep (May 16, 1991).
154. Mexico to Purchase Vancouver Stock Exchange Computerized Trading System, PR Newswire (July 22,
1991) (reporting that sale would take place on August 13, 1991).
155. Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and the Comision Nacional de Valores de Mexico On Consultation, Technical
Assistance, and Mutual Assistance for the Exchange of Information (Oct 18, 1990).
156. Id at § 3(l)(x).
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if different countries acting independently established identical penalties or
procedures for investigating suspected insider trading, minor sanctions and
the failure to provide any government agency with significant investigatory
powers suggest that some statutes are intended primarily for "window
dressing."'15 7 . In addition, foreign statutes rarely impose secondary liability on
corporations for insider trading by their employees or require companies to
adopt procedures designed to prevent insider trading by persons they control
or supervise.' 5 8 In comparison, recent amendments to the federal securities
laws reflect Congress' conclusion that increasing the potential liability of
employers for insider dealing by their employees is an effective means to
discourage insider abuses.
B.

Lessons for the United States

While criticisms of foreign insider trading laws are legitimate, the United
States can also learn from recent developments abroad. First, the United
States-in particular, Congress-should take note that other jurisdictions
resolutely have undertaken the task of drafting, and then adopting, insider
trading legislation. In comparison, the United States remains without a
statutory definition of insider trading, with the contours of the law left to the
federal courts to develop. As a result, not only traditional "corporate
insiders," but also market professionals and other investors lack the specific
159
guidance that a statutory definition of insider trading would provide.
Under any circumstances, the ambiguities in this area of the federal securities
laws would be unsettling. In today's international securities markets,
however, such ambiguities are inexcusable.
The ability of foreign countries to define insider trading in clear and
flexible terms belies oft-stated assertions in the United States that a legislative
definition of insider trading would sharply curtail the SEC's ability to
prosecute "evolving types of misconduct."'160 To the contrary, a statutory
definition of insider trading would simplify the offense, as well as eliminate
the SEC's need to rely upon Rule lOb-5 as its principal weapon against insider
trading.
Unsuccessful attempts by the government to prosecute tippees for insider
trading under Rule lOb-5 best illustrate the advantages of a statutory
157.

Despite its other strengths, the EEC's insider Trading Directive does not address these

concerns. Note, The Effects of the New EEC Draft Insider Trading Directive, 18 GaJ Intl & Comp L 119,

140 (1988) (authored by Douglas A. Hystrom).
158.

Note, A New Look at the European Economic Community Directive, 23 Vand

J Transnatl

L 135, 138,

169-72 (1990) (authored by Amy E. Stutz).
159. See Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A
Legislative Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading, 39 Ala L Rev 415,

417 (1988).
160, The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, Hearings before the Subcommittee on
Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 37
(1984) (statement byJohn M. Fedders, former SEC Enforcement Division Director, that a statutory
definition of insider trading was undesirable).
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definition of insider trading. In its decision in Dirks v. SEC, 16 1 the Supreme
Court held that the government must prove that a tipper communicated
inside information to a tippee in return for a "personal gain" in order to hold
either the tipper or the tippee liable under Rule lOb-5. Requiring a breach of
fiduciary duty by the tipper, the Court reasoned that "[a]bsent some personal
gain, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders."'' 62 This requirement
has led the SEC to make detailed and intrusive allegations regarding personal
relationships in order to establish that the tipper received a personal
benefit.' 6 3 The inclusion of such allegations in a complaint, however, does
not guarantee that the government will be able to prove that the disclosure of
inside information breached a fiduciary duty, as recently demonstrated by the
64
en banc decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Chestman.1
In comparison, foreign statutes prohibit divulging inside information in
broad terms and without reference to antiquated common-law fraud concepts,
which are of limited relevance in an impersonal marketplace. For example,
the EEC's insider Trading Directive provides that a person who possesses
inside information and cannot trade himself shall not disclose that
information to any third party, "unless such disclosure is made in the normal
course of the exercise of his employment, profession or duties."' 6 5 This
approach, which is vastly preferable, avoids the need to establish a breach of
fiduciary duty or the "personal gain" to the tipper.
This article does not suggest that a statutory definition of insider trading is
desirable simply because it might define the offense more broadly than have
recent court decisions. Instead, the principal objective should be to provide
161. 463 US 646, 659 (1983).
162. Id at 662.
163. See, for example, SEC v Thayer, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed Secur L Rptr (CCH)
99,718 at 97,903 (SD NY Jan 5, 1984) (allegations of "personal private relationship" included in
complaint to support claim that a tipper benefitted from trades by his mistress/tippee).
164. 947 F2d 551 (2d Cir 1991). The chain of information in Chestman started with Ira
Waldbaum, who disclosed to his sister, Shirley Witkin, that the grocery store chain bearing his family
name would be sold to the Greater Atlantic and Pacific Co. Witkin told her daughter, Shirley Loeb,
who passed the information to her husband, Keith Loeb. After Keith Loeb advised Chestman, his
broker, that "he had 'some definite, some accurate information' that Waldbaum was about to be sold
at a 'substantially higher' price than its market value," Chestman purchased 11,000 shares of
Waldbaum stock for his personal and customer accounts. Id at 555. The Second Circuit reversed
Chestman's criminal conviction under Rule lOb-5. The court held that there was insufficient
evidence that Keith Loeb had breached a "fiduciary-like relationship" with the Waldbaum family. Id
at 570. Absent a breach of fiduciary duty by Loeb, the court held, no basis existed to hold Chestman
derivatively liable as Loeb's tippee or as an aider and abettor. Id at 571.
Ironically, the court upheld Chestman's conviction under Exchange Act Rule 14e-3, 17 CFR
§ 240.14e-3 (1992), which expressly prohibits any person in possession of material information
relating to a tender offer which he or she knows or has reason to know has been acquired directly or
indirectly from persons associated with the acquiring company or the target company from trading in
the target company's securities (but does not require a breach of fiduciary duty). Chestman, 947 F2d
at 556-63. Although Rule 14e-3 applies only in the context of a tender offer, the court's decision
underscores the advantages of a statutory definition of insider trading from the government's
perspective.
165. EEC Insider Trading Directive, art 3(a), Proposal for a Council Directive Coordinating
Regulations on Insider Trading, 30 OJ Evr Comm (No C153) 8 (1987).
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clear guidance concerning the types of conduct that are forbidden. 66 This
objective could actually result in less expansive concepts of certain elements
16 7
of the offense.
Second, the adoption or enhancement of insider trading laws in foreign
jurisdictions reflects well on the SEC's more cooperative approach to
international enforcement matters in recent years. The Commission has
largely abandoned a unilateral approach to transnational enforcement, in
favor of closer cooperation with securities regulators in different countries. 16 8
Much of the Commission's energies in this area have been directed toward the
negotiation of MOUs with foreign governments, which establish procedures
for the exchange of information in cases of suspected insider trading and
other securities law violations.
Whether by design or by default, this process has improved the SEC's
relations with foreign governments and regulators. As other countries
identify areas of mutual interest with the United States while negotiating
MOUs, they become more attuned to the justifications for prosecuting insider
trading. Accordingly, there is a valuable lesson to be learned from the SEC's
efforts: negotiation, while time consuming, ultimately proves a more effective
means to secure the cooperation of foreign governments and financial
institutions than strong-arm tactics in the federal courts.
V
COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN THE NEW

ERA

Most of the preceding discussion examined the insider trading laws of
various jurisdictions on a nation-by-nation basis. In this section, the article
addresses the cumulative impact of these laws on entities, such as
multinational corporations and service firms, whose employees gain access to
material, nonpublic information on a routine basis.
Not so long ago, employers had little reason to concern themselves with
insider trading by their employees unless the transactions implicated the laws
of the few countries, including the United States, that treated insider trading
as an offense. As this logic no longer applies, employers that fail to evaluate
the need for firm-wide restrictions on insider trading do so at their peril.
166. Although opponents of a statutory definition argue that litigation resolves uncertainties in
the scope of insider trading liability, litigation is undeniably time-consuming as well as gut-wrenching
to defendants. See Karl Groskaufmanis, The SEC's Enforcement Nose Dive, Legal Times 21 (Dec 16,
1991) (discussing vagaries of insider trading litigation under Rule 1Ob-5).
167. For example, other countries that have defined insider trading restrict the categories of
information that may be deemed "material." See, for example, MOF Ordinance No 10 Japan)
(setting forth "matters considered to have an immaterial influence on the investment decisions of
investors"). In comparison, any fact whose disclosure could be found to have "significantly altered
the 'total mix' of information" available to a reasonable investor may be deemed "material" under
the federal securities laws. TSC Industries v Northway, Inc., 426 US 438, 449 (1976). Viewed in
hindsight, however, many facts may satisfy this standard and result in liability. See, for example, SEC
v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F2d 833, 849-52 (2d Cir 1968) (en banc) (rejecting lower court's holding
that " 'the test for materiality must necessarily be a conservative one' " and holding that preliminary
results from a core drilling were material).
168. See Pitt, Hardison & Shapiro, Problems with Enforcement at 342-49 (cited in note 24).
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Assessing the appropriate response to the new regulatory environment

requires employers to take into account a variety of practical and legal
considerations. For example, employers should consider the damage to their
reputations that might result if their employees were found-or even
rumored-to have abused information entrusted to them in the course of
their employment. Such factors become increasingly important as insider
trading is viewed less tolerantly abroad and may lead employers to adopt firmwide restrictions even with respect to employees and securities transactions in
countries where insider trading remains legal.
Determining whether employers may be exposed to liability if their
employees engage in insider trading abroad requires a more careful
assessment. In today's securities markets, more than one country may have an
interest in the application of its laws to a particular case of insider trading.
Jurisdiction and choice of law are not the only considerations, however;
employers must also review the legal principles governing their secondary
liability, if any, for insider trading by their employees. On balance, these
factors should lead many employers to conclude that firm-wide trading
policies may be appropriate.
A. Jurisdictional Scope of Insider Trading Laws
In the current regulatory environment, it will prove harder to conclude
that no nation will apply its insider trading laws to a specific transaction. The
United States, in particular, takes a broad view of jurisdiction under the
federal securities laws, premised on securities transactions and related
activities conducted through the means of "interstate commerce."' 69 As one
federal court has noted, these provisions frame a broad grant of jurisdiction,
but "furnish no specific indication of when American federal courts have
jurisdiction over securities law claims arising from extraterritorial
transactions."' 170 In a number of decisions over the past twenty years,
however, federal courts have indicated that they generally will exercise
jurisdiction over international securities transactions involving "significant
conduct" or "significant effects" in the United States or some combination of
conduct or effects in the United States.
In an insider trading case, a federal court clearly would assert jurisdiction
under a "conduct" analysis if trades were executed on a United States
169. See, for example, Exchange Act § 10, 15 USC § 78j (Supp II 1990).
170. Zoelsch v Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F2d 27, 30 (DC Cir 1987). Although Exchange Act
§ 30(b) provides that the Act shall not apply "to any person insofar as he transacts a business in
securities without the jurisdiction of the United States," this provision has been narrowly interpreted
as applying only to entities, such as broker-dealers, that conduct an ongoing securities business. See,
for example, Schoenbaum v Firstbrook, 405 F2d 200, 208 (2d Cir 1968), partially rev'd on other
grounds, 405 F2d 215 (1968) (en banc). In addition, the courts have interpreted the phrase "without
the jurisdiction of the United States" to refer to the jurisdictional limits of the federal courts, rather
than to the geographical boundaries of the United States. Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc., 389 F Supp
446, 458-59 (SD NY 1974), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 519 F2d 974 (2d Cir
1975).
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securities market.' 7 ' Other conduct in the United States that has been
deemed sufficient to support the exercise of jurisdiction over securities
transactions includes the use of the United States mails or telephones' 7 2 and
the transfer of funds into or out of the United States.' 7 3 In addition, meetings
in the United States during which material, nonpublic information was
disclosed might also support a finding ofjurisdiction, particularly in a lawsuit
brought by the SEC or by United States residents.' 74 Under an "effects" test,
U.S. courts have exercised jurisdiction, under federal securities laws, over
transactions executed on foreign exchanges that had a significant impact on
175
United States markets.
Accordingly, employers must be sensitive to the broad reach of the
securities laws of the United States. Moreover, other foreign countries that
prohibit insider trading might also assert jurisdiction over a particular
transaction. In the past, foreign countries have often limited jurisdiction
76
under their securities laws to transactions executed on domestic exchanges. 1
Other countries, however, have recently adopted broader jurisdictional
provisions which resemble the "conduct" and "effects" tests employed in the
United States.1 7 7 The variety in the jurisdictional scope of different laws only
further confounds the effort to predict the number of countries that might
assert jurisdiction over a specific transaction.
B.

Secondary Liability

Employers should also evaluate their potential secondary liability for
insider trading by their employees. As is true with respect to the exercise of
jurisdiction, the scope of secondary liability is broader in the United States
than in most countries; nonetheless, employers should anticipate heightened
liability abroad for insider trading violations by their employees in the future.
Under the federal securities laws of the United States, courts may impose
secondary liability on employers for insider trading by their employees based
171. See, for example, SEC v Tome, 638 F Supp 596, 600-01, 608 (SD NY 1986).
172. See, for example, SEC v GulfIntercontinentalFinance Corp., 223 F Supp 987, 995 (SD Fla 1963).
173. See, for example, SEC v Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 FRD 111, 118 (SD NY 1981).
174. See, for example, Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v Maxwell, 468 F2d 1326 (2d Cir 1972).
175. See, for example, Schoenbaum, 405 F2d at 206 (U.S. court asserted jurisdiction under § 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and Rule 1Ob-5 thereunder against Canadian company, the stock of which was
traded on the Toronto and American Stock Exchanges, where allegedly fraudulent acts in Canada
caused the stock's value to decline on the U.S. exchange). On the other hand, federal courts have
declined to exercise jurisdiction where the conduct abroad results in only "generalized effects" in the
United States. See, for example, HTv Vencap, Ltd., 519 F2d 1001, 1016-18 (2d Cir 1975) (refusing to
assert jurisdiction over fraudulent scheme abroad merely because some of alleged victims were U.S.
citizens or residents); Bersch v Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F2d 974, 987-88 (2d Cir 1975) (sale by
offshore mutual fund of Canadian securities held in its portfolio had insufficient impact on U.S.
markets to warrant exercise of jurisdiction).
176. See, for example, SML art 16bis (Mexico).
177. See, for example, Corporations Law § 1002 (Australia) (insider trading law applies to (a)
acts or omissions within Australia relating to the securities of any corporation, whether the
corporation was formed or does business in Australia and (b) acts or omissions outside Australia
relating to the securities of any corporation which was formed or does business in Australia);
Criminal Code (Netherlands) art 336a(2) (restrictions on insider trading apply to persons who effect
securities transactions from within the Netherlands on foreign exchanges).
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on common-law principles of respondeat superior or aiding and abetting, as well
as under the "controlling person" provisions of the Exchange Act.'

78

In

Act,' 179

controlling
addition, pursuant to recent amendments to the Exchange
persons may face civil fines for their employees' insider trading, in an amount
not to exceed $1 million per violation, or three times the amount of the profit
gained or the loss avoided as a result of the violation. While, as a practical
matter, controlling person liability is unlikely to be imposed on employersother than registered broker-dealers and investment advisers-without notice
that their employees are engaged, or about to engage, in illegal conduct,
these provisions create a strong incentive for firms to evaluate the need for
procedures restricting trading by their employees.
In comparison, the countries surveyed in Part III either limit secondary
liability or do not expressly subject employers to liability for insider trading
by their employees.' 8 0 Indeed, the absence of such provisions has been one
of the principal criticisms of foreign insider trading laws. In evaluating the
need for appropriate procedures, however, employers should assume that
some countries will amend their insider trading laws in the future to provide
for some form of "controlling person" liability. 18 1
C.

Development of Firm-Wide Policies

The potentially broad application of insider trading laws and the prospect
of heightened vicarious liability should lead many employers to consider
restrictions on trading by employees. 18 2 The adoption of such policies will
178. See Exchange Act § 20(a), 15 USC § 78t(a) (1988).
179. See Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 § 3(a), Pub L No 100704, 102 Stat 4677, 4677-78 (adding new § 21A to the Exchange Act) ("ITSFEA"). An employer is a
"controlling person" for purposes of § 21A. Report of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, HR Rep No 910, 100th Cong, 2d Sess 17, reprinted in 7 USCCAN 6043, 6054 (1988)
(ITSFEA was intended to "increase the economic incentive for [employers] to supervise vigorously
their employees").
Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act does not apply to the civil fines authorized by § 21A. Rather,
to impose fines on employers as controlling persons under this section, the SEC must establish that
the controlling person either (1) knew or recklessly disregarded the fact that the controlled person
was likely to engage in insider trading and failed to take "appropriate steps" to prevent such
conduct; or (2) in the case of broker-dealers or investment advisers registered with the SEC,
knowingly or recklessly failed to establish, maintain, or enforce procedures reasonably designed to
prevent the misuse of material, nonpublic information, and such failure substantially contributed to
or permitted the violation.
180. In Japan, employers whose employees engage in insider trading are subject to fines under
SEL art 207, whereas in Australia corporations are charged with knowledge of information in the
possession of their employees and, therefore, violate the law directly if they engage in prohibited
transactions. See Corporations Law § 1002E. Australia does not, however, currently impose liability
on employers for insider trading by their employees, nor do France, Germany, or Mexico.
181. This could occur either through adoption of specific statutory provisions imposing
derivative liability or application of traditional agency principles to hold employers liable for the
conduct of their employees.
182. In the authors' experience, many employers, such as multinational corporations and service
firms, have trading policies with respect to their United States-based employees and operations.
Such policies, however, may not be enforced with respect to foreign-based employees, based on an
assumption that they were intended to apply primarily in the United States.
Under the federal securities laws of the United States, registered broker-dealers and investment
advisers are required to "establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably
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not insulate an employer from liability for wrongful conduct by its employees.
At a minimum, however, they provide guidance to employees who seek to
comply with fast-changing legal requirements.
A program designed to reduce the risk of insider trading by employees
and an employer's liability for its employees' transactions might include some
combination of the following elements: (1) restrictions on access to inside
information within the company; 18 3 (2) restrictions on securities
transactions; 81 4 (3) pre-clearance of trades by the employer; 8 5 (4) restrictions
on short-term trading; 186 (5) affirmations of compliance by employees with
company policies; 187 and (6) training sessions.' 8 8 Each employer must decide
what, if any, guidelines and restrictions on trading by its employees are
appropriate, taking into account the sensibilities of its employees in different
locations.
VI
CONCLUSION

Insider trading was once viewed as a concern, if not a problem, unique to
the United States. The adoption and enhancement of foreign insider trading
laws in recent years demonstrates otherwise. While no other country has
demonstrated the same commitment as the United States to the investigation
and prosecution of insider trading, developments abroad reflect the growing
international consensus that insider trading is inconsistent with basic
principles of fair dealing and should not only be discouraged, but punished.
designed . .. to prevent the misuse . . . of material, nonpublic information ....

." Exchange Act
§ 15(f), 15 USCA § 780(0 (1991); Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 204A, 15 USCS § 80b-4A
(1991). While other employers are not expressly required to adopt such policies and procedures,
failure to do so may nevertheless increase their potential secondary liability.
183. For example, an employer might restrict access by employees to files likely to contain inside
information, require the use of code names for sensitive projects, and adopt procedures governing
the creation, maintenance, and destruction of confidential documents.
184. An employer may bar its employees from trading in the company's securities, as well as the
securities of companies with which the employer does business, in order to avoid the potential
appearance of impropriety. As an alternative, some companies have adopted internal "codes of
conduct," which provide that no employee may trade in securities while in possession of material,
nonpublic information obtained during the course of his or her employment.
185. Firms that routinely obtain access to material, nonpublic information often require
employees (and other members of their households) who intend to engage in securities transactions
to affirm that they do not possess any material, nonpublic information regarding the issuer. While a
pre-clearance requirement imposes a substantial administrative burden on an employer, it
demonstrates the employer's good-faith effort to monitor securities transactions by persons
entrusted with confidential information.
186. Many employers discourage employees from engaging in short-term trading-purchasing
and selling securities within less than a 12-month period-since "in-and-out" trading is often
characteristic of insider trading and is, therefore, more likely to attract the attention of regulatory
authorities.
187. Employers that adopt procedures on securities trading generally require their employees to
affirm their understanding of-and compliance with-such procedures when hired, and on a regular
basis thereafter.
188. In addition to meeting with new employees, employers should hold periodic sessions to
emphasize legal restrictions on insider trading, as well as ethical and business considerations that
may require adherence to standards beyond those mandated by law.

